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Kronzer: Jury Tampering - 1978 Style Lawyer's Forum.

JURY TAMPERING-1978 STYLE
W. JAMES KRONZER"
Today we again witness an attack upon our tort reparations system by the casualty insurance industry. The present attack closely
resembles the affront that occurred in the 1950's and the 1960's
which was mounted by the same group. Intrinsic to both of these
attacks is the insurance industry's attempt to reach and affect potential jurors although, no doubt, the current attack is more insidious and effective.
The recent attempt to influence jurors has taken several forms.
One form has been direct assaults through premium/verdict advertisements by companies like Crum & Forster and Aetna.' Crum &
Forster's ads suggest, "The jury smiled when they made the
award. They didn't know it was coming out of their own pockets."'
The consequence, according to these advertisements, is that the jury
gave an unconscionable amount because "it wouldn't hurt to be
generous." 3 This same group has misrepresented the number of
"product liability" claims filed, as well as referred to fictitious cases
in their ads. The company has even suggested, "There isn't a product made that cannot be misused,"I implying that one who misuses
a product can recover for injuries resulting from that misuse.
One of Aetna's ads states, "Too bad judges can't read this to a
jury" and suggests that jurors be instructed: "The jury is cautioned
to be fair and to bear in mind that money does not grow on trees. It
must be paid through insurance premiums from uninvolved parties,
such as yourselves." 5 Like Crum & Forster's ads, Aetna's advertisements misrepresent the number of claims filed, report on fictitious
cases, and give incomplete facts. Another of these specious ads
commences, "And Now, The Big Winners In Today's Lawsuits,"
suggesting that damage awards for personal injury litigation often
greatly exceed the actual extent of the injury.' Aetna has also at* L.L.B., with honors, University of Texas; Partner, Kronzer, Abraham & Watkins,
Houston, Texas.
1. See appendices A and B.
2. See appendix B.
3. See appendix B.
4. See Young v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., No. B-78-62 (D. Conn., Jan. 11, 1979) (exhibit
A) (order remanding to state court as directed in consolidation with Naylor v. Case &
McGrath, Inc., 585 F.2d 557 (2d Cir. 1978)).
5. See appendix A.
6. See Young v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., No. B-78-62 (D. Conn., Jan. 11, 1979) (exhibit
G).
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tempted to reach jurors more indirectly through incredible ads
which attempt to spawn a "no-fault" system.7
These advertisements appearing in national publications question the economic and moral underpinnings of personal injury litigation judgments. Such attacks by large, well-financed insurance
companies on the present tort compensation system, attempting to
influence jurors to disregard their oaths to decide cases only on the
evidence presented in court, cannot be counteracted by advertisements by individual plaintiffs.' While this recent insurance company offensive is being curtailed to some extent by courts and insurance commissions,' the process is exceedingly slow. Furthermore,
long range control of these improprieties is more than can be expected within the limitations of the judicial process. Therefore, the
more immediate question, and the one that relates directly to the
preservation of the right of trial by jury, concerns the power of the
judicial system to eradicate or enervate the damage done. It is in
this area that the St. Mary's Law Journal has proposed a dialogue
between counsel on "both sides of the docket." Mr. Mike Hatchell,
representing the "defense" viewpoint, has written an excellent article in which he delineates the current status of the Texas law on the
question of eradicating such influences, either by voir dire examination or by instructions from the court, and concludes, for a number
of reasons, that the current hardline rule in Texas should be followed. There is little that can be added to his discussion and presentation of the Texas authorities, and his research of authority from
other jurisdictions is excellent; our difference lies in the interpretation of these authorities and in his conclusions and opinions that
there is no need for further judicial "treatment" of the wounds.
7. Aetna has used "dramatizations" in its "no-fault" ads that are patently deceitful and
calculated to impress jurors that the present tort reparation system does not work. The most
offensive of these ads is the "man in the middle" ad which implies that over fifty percent of
the money awarded an injured plaintiff is consumed by the costs of the present system.
8. Nor can the sting of these ads be removed by humorous articles such as Art Buchwald's in which the reluctant juror goes along with the others, rendering a verdict for the
plaintiff but with reservations that their verdict might result in the insurance carrier having
to sell its golf course. See 124 CONG. REc. E3854 (daily ed. July 18, 1978).
9. Presently, both Crum & Forster and Aetna have signed consent orders with state
insurance commissions agreeing not to publish the contested ads. See Consent order signed
by the Crum & Forster Companies with the Connecticut Insurance Department (August 16,
1978); Consent order signed by the Crum & Forster Companies with the Kansas Insurance
Commissioner (June 27, 1978); Consent order signed by Aetna with the Kansas Insurance
Commissioner (June 24, 1978). Additionally, suits have been filed by plaintiffs in personal
injury litigation seeking to enjoin the ads. See Young v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., No. B-7862 (D. Conn., Jan. 11, 1979); Parris v. Garner Commercial Disposal, Inc., No. 77-VCS 879
(N.C. Super. Ct., filed Nov. 18, 1977).
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NEW PROBLEMS IN VOIR DIRE

THE EXISTING TEXAS ATrITUDE ABOUT JURIES AND INSURANCE

Texas does indeed have an extremely strict prohibition against
injecting or introducing the fact that any party is or is not protected
by some form of insurance."0 The zenith of this preemptive rule is
Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Jones" in which the Tyler Court of Civil
Appeals reversed and remanded a case in which a compensation
insurance carrier was joined in a suit against Kirby."2 There was no
showing of "harm" within the context of rule 434, but the reversal
bottomed upon the outdated "presumed harm" rule. The Tyler
court held:
Although we are keenly aware of the holding of the Supreme Court
in Dennis v. Hulse ... holding that even though the record discloses

that the question of insurance was improperly injected into the case,
and even though such error was reasonably calculated to cause a
miscarriage of justice, the party appealing must also show that it
probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment under
rules 434 and 503, T.R.C.P., yet as we read the cases, the Supreme
Court remains committed to the view that the Court will take judicial
knowledge of the fact that a jury is more apt to render a judgment
against a Defendant, and for a larger amount, if it knows that the
Defendant is protected by insurance.' 3
While the Jones case did not involve voir dire examination, it does
clearly reflect the traditional Texas attitude about any suggestion
that either party to the suit may be protected by some form of
insurance.
Recently, however, some Texas courts have not treated this prohibition as an ironclad rule requiring automatic reversal." Some
courts of civil appeals have allowed the plaintiff to ask prospective
jurors whether they had any connection or relationship with the
insurance industry. 5 In South Austin Drive-In Theatre v. Thomison the court held that "in the absence of a clear inference of the
10. Courts, however, do not treat injection of lack of insurance as strictly as they have
the injection of insurance. See Villanueva v. Rodriguez, 300 S.W.2d 668, 670 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1957, writ refd n.r.e). In Villanueva the court said statements by a juror

indicating she would not decide the case against the defendant because the defendant

"would have to pay the money out of his pocket" (an inference that there was no insurance),
was not jury misconduct. Id. at 670.
11. 383 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1964, writ rerd n.r.e.).
12. Id. at 615-16.
13. Id. at 616.
14. See, e.g., St. Louis Sw. Ry. v. Gregory, 387 S.W.2d 27, 33 (Tex. 1965); Dennis v.
Hulse, 362 S.W.2d 308, 309 (Tex. 1962); South Austin Drive-In Theatre v. Thomison, 421
S.W.2d 933, 941 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

15. See McDonough Bros., Inc. v. Lewis, 464 S.W.2d 457, 464 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
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existence of insurance in the case" it would not be error to make a
good faith inquiry about connection with the insurance industry.',
Additionally, the Texas Supreme Court has held that mention' of
insurance does not always require reversal and that the appellant
must show that the mention probably did cause an improper judgment.'7
Although these cases may represent a trend toward liberalizing
the prohibition, there has been no landslide in this direction on the
trial court level. In practice, trial courts uniformly refuse to allow
counsel to make reference, either in voir dire examination or in jury
argument, to rule 226A of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure which
provides for an instruction not to consider whether any party is
protected by insurance.' 8 Additionally, it has been held that giving
the instruction does not cure the improper mention of insurance in
voir dire examination, at least when the overtone of existence of
coverage is projected." At the trial court level, therefore, the prohibition remains strong although there has been some appellate enervation of the relic.
In fact, contrary to Mr. Hatchell's contention, rule 226A was a
direct judicial response to the earlier attack upon the tort system
in the 1950's and early 1960's. Although the rule was not immediately forthcoming, by order of the Texas Supreme Court on July 21,
1970, jurors were to thereafter be instructed in writing "not [to]
consider, discuss, nor speculate whether or not any party is or is not
protected in whole or in part by insurance of any kind." ' It is
perhaps true that this change in the rules was intended primarily
Antonio 1971), writ ref'd n.r.e.); Kollmorgan v. Scott, 447 S.W.2d 236, 238 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1969, no writ); South Austin Drive-In Theatre v. Thomison, 421

S.W.2d 933, 941-42 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austiri 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Another civil appeals
court has held that such questions did not necessarily constitute reversible error. See Shoppers World v. Villarreal, 518 S.W.2d 913, 920-21 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
16. South Austin Drive-In Theatre v. Thomison, 421 S.W.2d 933, 941 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
17. Dennis v. Hulse, 362 S.W.2d 308, 309 (Tex. 1962); see St. Louis Sw. Ry. v. Gregory,
387 S.W.2d 27, 33 (Tex. 1965); Meyers v. Searcy, 488 S.W.2d 509, 514-15 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1972, no writ); El Rancho Restaurants, Inc. v. Garfield, 440 S.W.2d 873,
880 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); TEx. R. Civ. P. 226a. "Not every
mention of insurance requires the setting aside of a jury's verdict." St. Louis Sw. Ry. v.
Gregory, 387 S.W.2d 27, 33 (Tex. 1965).
18. TEx. R. Civ. P. 226a.
19. A. J. Miller Trucking Co. v. Wood, 474 S.W. 2d 763, 766 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1971,

writ refd n.r.e.). If the "rule" of this case is followed it will be virtually impossible to expand
voir dire to encompass questions concerning deceptive advertisements.
20. TEX. R. Civ. P. 226a.
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to inform jurors that they are not to consider such matters in their
deliberations, rather than to qualify jurors for purposes of selection
prior to being impaneled as jurors for the case. Nonetheless, the rule
was a response to, the increasing presence of insurance in personal
injury litigation and the greater number of instances in which jurors had either considered the presence or absence of insurance protection.
Yet, rule 226A has done little to reduce a plaintiff's problems.
Although the instruction directs jurors not to consider insurance
when deciding the case, the recent advertisements by insurance
companies may still have an effect on their verdict. 2 ' Currently,
most Texas courts will probably prohibit questions during voir dire
concerning exposure to these ads, and thus, a plaintiff is denied an
opportunity to uncover grounds for challenge for cause, to intelligently exercise peremptory challenges, or to "rehabilitate" potential
jurors.2" This failure of Texas courts to permit a broader voir dire
examination of the jury concerning extraneous influences such as
these insurance company advertisements does not indicate that the
jury system has accommodated itself to influences of this type.
Rather, it is suggested that the Texas judiciary has been willing to
21. See Loftus, InsuranceAdvertising and Jury Awards, 65 A.B.A.J. 68, 69 (Jan. 1979)
(exposure to insurance advertisements will reduce verdicts).
22. On November 15, 1978, the Arkansas Supreme Court "attacked the citadel" in
King v. Westlake, holding that voir dire questions by plaintiff's counsel concerning liability
insurance company ads were permissible. All but two of the potential jurors stated they had
seen the ads in Time, Wall Street Journal, and Smithsonian Institute. Plaintiff's counsel
continued:
It is improper for either side to imply or suggest that the defendant does or does
not have insurance, and the questions I will now direct to you have nothing to do with
whether or not the defendant has insurance. The questions I will ask concern your
insurance premiums, not insurance in this case. How many of you believe that jury
verdicts affect insurance premiums?
The question I have been building up to is this: Assuming that the verdict you
render could cost you a little more or a little less money on your insurance premiums,
can you listen to the testimony, the statements of counsel, and the instructions and
then put aside the financial interest you have in the case because of your insurance
premiums and render a verdict? (All jurors raised their hands.)
King v. Westlake, 572 S.W.2d 841, 844 (Ark. 1978). As could be expected, defense counsel
complained that the effect of this voir dire was to implant in the minds of the jurors the fact
that the defendant had liability insurance. After noting that the questioning was obviously
in "good faith," the court observed:
[Tihe purpose of voir dire examination is to enable counsel to ascertain whether there
is ground for a challenge of a juror for cause, or for a peremptory challenge and ...
so long as counsel acts in good faith, he may, in one form or another question prospective jurors respecting their interest or connection with liability insurance companies.
Id. at 844 (emphasis added).
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let juries flounder in speculation regarding coverage, or lack of it,
and further, to not permit a fair exposure of the jurors who may have
been contaminated.
THE STRICT RULE

Is No

LONGER JUSTIFIED

Not all jurisdictions have such a strict prohibition against any
reference to insurance. Most states will allow the plaintiff to question prospective jurors about a connection with a liability insurance
company, 3 and two states will allow the insurance company to be
joined as a party defendant. 4 In fact, the tendency has been toward
relaxing the traditional rule as courts reexamine the justifications
for the rule. 5
This tendency toward lessening the fervor with which the traditional prohibition was enforced comports more readily with modem
reality than does Texas' overly strict rule. The existence of insurance in many personal injury cases is no secret to most jurors." In
fact, with knowledge of financial responsibility laws requiring liability insurance for motorists 27 and of the realities of modem society,
jurors usually assume that the defendant is insured. 8 Thus, any
23. See, e.g., Hart v. Wielt, 84 Cal. Rptr. 220, 224 (Ct. App. 1970) (may ask whether
prospective jurors are interested in a particular insurance company); Cain v. Wilson, 506 P.2d
1240, 1243 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972) (citing other cases permitting question concerning specific
insurance company, including Mayer v. Sampson, 402 P.2d 185, 188 (Colo. 1965)); Johnson
v. Watson, 265 N.E.2d 891, 893 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971) (question about interest in insurance
company not improper). These questions have also been allowed by federal courts. See
Kiernan v. Van Schaik, 347 F.2d 775, 782 (3d Cir. 1965). See generally C. MCCORMICK, LAW
OF EVIDENCE § 201, at 481 (1972); Comment, Voir Dire Examination of Jurors Concerning
Insurance Company Interests, 15 DE PAUL L. REV. 148, 149 (1965).
24. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22.655 (West 1978); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 632.24 (West
Spec. Pamphlet 1978).
25. Takoma Park Bank, Inc. v. Abbott, 19 A.2d 169, 176 (Md. 1941); see Causey v.
Cornelius, 330 P.2d 468, 472-73 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Allred v. Chittenden Pool Supply,
Inc., 298 So. 2d 361, 364-65 (Fla. 1974); Runnacles v. Doddrell, 157 A.2d 836, 839 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1960). See generally C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 201, at 482
(1972); 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 282a, at 138-47 (1940); Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 761, 764 (1949).
26. See Pinkerton v. Oak Park Nat'l Bank, 147 N.E.2d 390, 394 (Ill. App. Ct. 1958);
Connelly v. Nolte, 21 N.W.2d 311, 320 (Iowa 1946); Johnson v. Hansen, 389 P.2d 330, 332
(Or. 1964) (en banc). "Any juror who doesn't know that there is liability insurance in the case
by this time should probably be excused by virtue of the fact he or she is an idiot." Young v.
Carter, 173 S.E.2d 259, 261 (Ga. Ct. App. 1970) (concurring opinion).
27. See Causey v. Cornelius, 330 P.2d 468, 473 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Runnacles v.
Doddrell, 157 A.2d 836, 838 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1960). See generally C. McCoRMICK,
LAW OF EVIDENCE § 201, at 481 (1972); Green, Blindfolding the Jury, 33 TEXAS L. REV. 157,
166 (1954). In a survey in 1959, 83.3% of the citizens in the twenty-eight states from which
statistics were taken were covered by automobile liability insurance. Ames, The Automobile
Accident Commission Proposal:An IrrationalConcept, 14 U. FLA. L. REV. 398, 400 (1961-62).
28. See, e.g., Causey v. Cornelius, 330 P.2d 468, 474 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Pinkerton
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attempt to conceal the existence of insurance is unlikely to be successful and is therefore pointless. 9
The principal ground of support for the prohibition is that knowledge that the defendant is protected by insurance will increase the
likelihood and the size of a verdict for the plaintiff. This fear has
never been substantiated, however, and may be based upon mere
conjecture. 0 Indeed, cases can be cited in which the result was
exactly converse to that feared.3 Plaintiffs should not be denied
valuable information, necessary for intelligent exercise of their challenges, by a prohibition based on conjecture. Such a significant
encroachment on a plaintiffs right to a trial by an impartial jury
should be supported by factual data rather than an unverified sup-

position .32
Since the traditional rule is no longer successful in its objective
and cannot be justified on a factual basis, it is time to reexamine
it.33 In the proper instance, the modern jury can safely be made
aware of the real parties in interest.3 4 Indeed, it may be "time to deal
v. Oak Park Nat'l Bank, 147 N.E.2d 390, 394 (Ill. App. Ct. 1958); Runnacles v. Doddrell, 157
A.2d 836, 838 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1960). This assumption on the part of jurors has
been noted by most authorities. See C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 201, at 481 (1972);
C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE § 1539, at 396 (2d ed. 1956); 2 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 282a, at 146 (1940); Green, Blindfolding the Jury, 33 TEXAS L. REv. 157, 166
(1954).
29. See Pinkerton v. Oak Park Nat'l Bank, 147 N.E.2d 390, 394 (Ill. App. Ct. 1958);
Johnson v. Hansen, 389 P.2d 330, 334 (Or. 1964)(en banc)(concurring opinion); Green,
Blindfolding the Jury, 33 TEXAS L. REv. 157, 160 (1954).
30. See Muehlebach v. Mercer Mortuary & Chapel, Inc., 378 P.2d 741, 742 (Ariz.
1963)(en banc) (fear of higher verdict not as likely as once thought); Moniz v. Bettencourt,
76 P.2d 535, 539 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1938); Johnson v. Hansen, 389 P.2d 330, 336 (Or.
1964)(en banc)(concurring opinion); Texas Co. v. Betterton, 126 Tex. 359, 362, 88 S.W.2d
1039, 1040 (1936). See generally C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE § 1539,
at 396 (2d ed. 1956); Green, Blindfolding the Jury, 33 TEXAS L. REV. 157, 160-61 (1954).
31. In Southwestern Freight Lines v. McConnell the first trial, in which there was no
mention of the defendant's insurance, resulted in a verdict of $4,310.50; in the second trial,
in which insurance was mentioned, the verdict was only for $3,750. Southwestern Freight
Lines v. McConnell, 269 S.W.2d 427, 430-31 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Leon Green in his article criticizing the prohibition against informing the jury about the
existence of insurance cites to a similar case, Gladewater Laundry & Dry Cleaners, Inc. v.
Newman, 141 S.W.2d 951 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1940, writ dism'd judgment cor.).
Green, Blindfolding the Jury, 33 TEXAS L. REv. 157, 160 n.17 (1954).
32. See Green, Blindfolding the Jury, 33 TEXAS L. REV. 157, 161 (1954).
33. See, e.g., Muehleback v. Mercer Mortuary & Chapel, Inc., 378 P.2d 741, 742 (Ariz.
1963)(en banc); Causey v. Cornelius, 330 P.2d 468, 472 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Young v.
Carter, 173 S.E.2d 259, 260 (Ga. Ct. App. 1970)(concurring opinion). See generally C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 201, at 482 (1972); C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EvIDENCE § 1539, at 396 (2d ed. 1956). The only real purpose of the strict rule is to provide a
"fertile source of errors" for the insurance company. Green, Blindfolding the Jury, 33 TEXAS
L. REV. 157, 167 (1954); accord, Causey v. Cornelius, 330 P.2d 468, 473 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1958).
34. See Causey v. Cornelius, 330 P.2d 408, 472-73 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958); C. MCCOR-
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with jurors as intelligent persons who can be trusted to treat parties
justly and to uphold the dignity . . . of their functions"35 and relax
the prohibition against reference to insurance when there are sound
3
countervailing interests justifying such relaxation.
INSURANCE COMPANIES HAVE OPENED THE DOOR To Voir
EXAMINATION ABOUT THE ADVERTISEMENTS

Dire

Even under the traditional rule, plaintiffs should be allowed to
question prospective jurors about the ads in question. While ordinarily under this rule all inferences to insurance are forbidden, the
premium/verdict advertisements disseminated by the insurance
companies create a totally new situation. By printing advertisements aimed at potential jurors proclaiming an alleged correlation
between jury verdict and insurance premiums the insurance companies have opened the door to discussion of these ads. It is the insurance company advertising that is making jurors aware of the existence of insurance, not plaintiff's questions on voir dire. The companies should not be allowed to publish these ads in an attempt to
influence potential jurors and still receive the protection of the traditional prohibition at trial.
Presently, these companies are attempting to accomplish just
such a coup. Despite their protests to the contrary, the insurance
companies have published these ads in an attempt to influence
potential jurors. 7 These companies have spent large sums of money
in an attempt to influence verdicts in personal injury cases.3 They
seek to implant a prejudicial attitude against plaintiffs in the minds
of potential jurors, thereby inducing such jurors to find no liability
in personal injury cases or award damages in an amount less than
that proved by the evidence.
In seeking to influence jurors to violate their oaths as jurors, the
MICK & R. R-.Y, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE § 1539, at 396 (2d ed. 1956); Green, Blindfolding
the Jury, 33 TEXAS L. REV. 157, 163 (1954).
35. Green, Blindfolding the Jury, 33 TEXAS L. REV. 157, 164 n.22 (1954); accord, C.
MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE. § 201, at 482 (1972).
36. See Runnacles v. Doddrell, 157 A.2d 836, 839 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1960).
37. See Muehlebach v. Mercer Mortuary & Chapel, Inc., 378 P.2d 741, 744 (Ariz.
1963)(en banc); Causey v. Cornelius, 330 P.2d 468, 473 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Quinn v.
Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 409 N.Y.S.2d 473, 480 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
38. See Muehlebach v. Mercer Mortuary & Chapel, Inc., 378 P.2d 741, 744 (Ariz.
1963)(en banc). These expenditures are estimated to be over ten million dollars. Loftus,
Insurance Advertising and Jury Awards, 65 A.B.A.J. 68, 69, 70 (Jan. 1979); see Aetna and
the First Amendment, 8 JURIS DOCTOR 30, 30 (Dec. 1978/Jan. 1979)(Aetna reported a $5.5
million media budget).
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ads deny plaintiffs their rights to a fair and impartial trial,'3 and
may even constitute jury tampering. 0 Under Texas law a person is
guilty of a Class A misdemeanor if he attempts "to influence the
outcome of the preceding on the basis of considerations other than
those authorized by law."' The insurance company advertising
comes precariously close to violating this standard.42
THE INSURANCE COMPANIES ARE TRYING To MAKE JURIES AWARE THAT
CORPORATIONS ARE INSURED

These ads represent a deliberate attempt by the insurance companies to influence jury verdicts in suits involving corporate defendants. Having effectively created insurance cost consciousness in
vehicular accident cases, the companies, or at least some of them,
obviously desire to penetrate the area of "big verdicts." It is obvious
that the thrust of the propaganda mills is to make the jurors conscious that any award may affect their pocketbooks, thereby injecting an entirely improper element into jury consideration." The ads
are intended to cause juries to realize that the super-corporations
also procure casualty insurance protection and that a large award
will also "come out of their pockets." The "tampering" aspect is
most clearly reflected at this level of the advertisements. Jurors do
not now recognize that General Motors or General Electric or General Foods also have insurance protection, and thus in rendering
their "fair and reasonable" awards jurors consider solely the defendant's liability without the extraneous injection of insurance protection. The recent media blitz was intended to cause the jurors to
render lower verdicts because of insurance protection. Some courts
and insurance commissions are not accepting the blitz, and it is
suggested that the trial judges of Texas should do the same.
39. See Quinn v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 409 N.Y.S.2d 473, 478, 480 (Sup. Ct. 1978).

40. See id. at 480.
41. TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. § 36.04(a) (Vernon 1974).
42. See id.; cf. Quinn v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 409 N.Y.S.2d 473, 480 (Sup. Ct. 1978)
(advertisements violate New York's jury tampering law and state public policy).

43. The argument that a verdict should be reduced because insurance rates will be
increased is not any more justifiable than an argument that a verdict should be increased
because the defendant is insured. The only true basis for the award is the facts of the
particular case which establish "fair and reasonable compensation," subject to judicial control for gross excessiveness or inadequacy. At least one Texas court has held that in the case
of "super-corporations" there is no error in advising the panel that they are not to consider
who will pay the judgment, what type of judgment will be entered, or whether it will ever be
paid. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Capps, 170 S.W.2d 522, 524 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland,
1943, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
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ENJOIN THE ADVERTISEMENTS

The insurance company ads have had their desired effect. A recent study has shown that just one exposure to an ad will significantly affect the verdict a juror would award." This data becomes
more alarming when it is realized that most jurors have probably
been exposed to these ads several times.45 Since individual plaintiffs
cannot hope to match the resources of the insurance companies in
order to defend themselves with rebuttal advertisements," attempts
have been made to prohibit the ads through the judicial system.
These attempts to enjoin insurance company advertising are destined for only limited success, however, because the advertising is
entitled to some first amendment protection. While it is rather
anomalous to find insurance companies seeking protection from the
Constitution in view of their recent attempts, through "no-fault"
laws, to hinder the constitutional rights of injured plaintiffs, 7 the
first amendment does provide some protection for advertising.48
Earlier attempts to enjoin similar insurance propaganda found
courts were very sympathetic to this claim of constitutional protection."
The Constitution, however, does not protect advertising that is
misleading or deceptive. Commercial speech that is false or misleading is entitled to no protection whatsoever, and is properly subject to government regulation." ° The recent insurance company
44. Loftus, Insurance Advertising and Jury Awards, 65 A.B.A.J. 68, 69 (Jan. 1979).
45. Id. at 70. Over the last twenty years the cumulative effect of these advertisements
could be enormous. The ads published in the late 1950's were aimed at reaching one out of
every three potential jurors-over 70 million persons. Causey v. Cornelius, 330 P.2d 468, 473
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958); People ex rel Barton v. American Auto Ins. Co., 282 P.2d 559, 561
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955). The present ads were published in approximately eighteen national periodicals and were aimed at an estimated audience of 30 million persons. Aetna and
the First Amendment, 8 JURIs DOCTOR 30, 30 (Dec. 1978/Jan. 1979).
46. See generally Plaintiff's Complaint, Parris 'v. Garner Commercial Disposal, Inc.,
No. 77-CVS 879 (N.C. Super. Ct., filed Nov. 18, 1977).
47. "It was a colossal spectacle to see the merchandisers of constitutional restrictions on
the rights of the injured scrambling to hide behind the Constitution." Colley, President's
Page, 14 TRIAL 4, 4 (Sept. 1978).
48. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 765 (1976); Quinn v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 409 N.Y.S.2d 473, 477 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
49. See Hoffman v. Perrucci, 117 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Pa. 1953), appeal dismissed, 222
F.2d 709 (3d Cir. 1955); United States ex rel May v. American Mach. Co., 116 F. Supp. 160,
163 (E.D. Wash. 1953); Hendrix v. Consolidated Van Lines, Inc., 269 P.2d 435, 442 (Kan.
1954).
50. See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n., U.S ...
98 S. Ct. 1912, 1922,
56 L. Ed. 2d 444, 457 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,

-

U.S.

-

,

, 97

S. Ct.

2691, 2708-09, 53 L. Ed. 2d 810, 835 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
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premium/verdict advertising easily fits into this unprotected category.5
The Ads Are Deceptive and Inaccurate
The advertisements are designed to deceive the reader into believing that the present tort compensation system is in a state of crisis.
This insurance company propaganda relies heavily on fictitious incidents and inaccurate figures. Even the insurance industry has
admitted that the infamous "lawnmower as a hedgeclipper" case
cannot be substantiated.5 2 In all likelihood the story is a complete
fabrication similar to other insurance advertising claims.
Crum & Forster's "afety pin" ad, implying a manufacturer was
found liable because a pin was swallowed, cannot be substantiated
by citation to an actual case either.5" This advertisement is patently
misleading in two respects. First, it causes the reader to believe an
actual case exists, and second, it implies that one who misuses a
product can recover for injuries caused by that misuse.54 Aetna's
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976). Additionally, in this instance the
insurance companies' right to advertise must be balanced against plaintiffs' right to a fair
and impartial trial. See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 396 (1962). In view of the companies'
direct attack on prospective jurors, the balance should be weighted more heavily in favor of
plaintiffs' fair trial. Quinn v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 409 N.Y.S. 2d 743, 480 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
See generally Note, Newspaper Advertising-An Interference With A Fair Trial By Jur?,
22 U. Prrr. L. REV. 601, 601 (1961).
51. The advertising has frequently been referred to in such terms as "misleading,"
"deceptive," and "false." See Quinn v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 409 N.Y.S.2d 473, 478 (Sup.
Ct. 1978) (misleading); SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL, INVESTMENT, AND BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES,
PRODUCT LIABILITY INSURANCE, H.R. REP. No. 95-997, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1978) (false and
misleading); 124 CONG. REC. H3706 (daily ed. May 9, 1978) (trying to "sell" higher insurance
rates through false advertising); Adding Insult to Injury-The Drive to Change the ProductLiability Laws, 43 CONSUMER REP. 412, 414 (July 1978)(insulting and misleading). Several
companies have agreed to stop publication of the ads in consent decrees with state insurance
commissions in which the commissioner has alleged that the advertisements were false and
misleading. See note 9 supra.
52. In a recent article Jerry Geisel tracks down the source of this legend only to find it
has no basis in fact. Geisel, Horror Story Ads Untrue?-Can'tProve Mower, Claims Assertions, 11 Bus. INS. 1,66 (October 31, 1977); see SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL, INVESTMENT, AND
BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES, PRODUCT LIABILITY INSURANCE, H.R. REP. No. 95-997, 95th Cong.,

2d Sess. 38, 50 (1978); Fisk, An Interview With John LaFalce, 14 TRIAL 58, 60' (Nov. 1978);
Adding Insult to Injury-The Drive to Change the Product-Liability Laws, 43 CONSUMER
REP. 412, 413-14 (July 1978).
53. See Consent order signed by the Crum & Forster companies with the Connecticut
Insurance Department (Aug. 16, 1978) (commissioner's allegations); Consent order signed by
the Crum & Forster companies with the Kansas Insurance Commissioner (June 27,

1978)(commissioner's allegations).
54. See SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL, INVESTMENT, AND BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES, PRODUCT
LIABILITY INSURANCE, H.R. REP. No. 95-997, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1978). Misuse is a defense
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advertisements cite to case histories but fail to disclose key facts or
mitigating factors." These careful omissions mislead the reader into
believing that the tort system is unjust and provides windfall verdicts to undeserving parties."
Perhaps the best example of the deceptions and inaccuracies in
these advertisements is the repeated assertion that one million
product liability suits are being filed each year. This claim is simply
untrue. The Insurance Services Offices (ISO) estimates that at most
only 140,000 product liability claims were filed in 1977. ' 1Thus, the
figure cited in the advertising was at least 700 percent higher than
the highest estimate of actual claims.5" This gross exaggeration of
the number of claims is just another way in which insurance companies are trying to convince readers that a "crisis" exists that must
be cured by awarding lower verdicts and by "reform" of the tort
system.
There Is No Crisis
The truth of the matter, however, is that there is no crisis. Whatever else may be true since the first attack in the 1950's and 1960's,
primarily addressed to the "whiplash" injury and the "low back
syndrome," cases against individual defendants for vehicular accidents are simply no longer economically productive in the courts.
One need look no further than recent advance sheets and compare
the number of cases noted under "Automobiles" in 1968. Perhaps
this decrease has prevented the imposition of a "no-fault" system,
to a product liability claim. See, e.g., Latimer v. General Motors Corp., 535 F.2d 1020, 1023
(7th Cir. 1976); Findlay v. Copeland Lumber Co., 509 P.2d 28, 31 (Or. 1973); General Motors
Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 349 (Tex. 1977). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A, Comment h (1965).
55. For example, Aetna's "Too bad judges can't read this" ad fails to disclose all the facts
about the injuries to the driver of the "truck without brake lights," nor does it reveal that
the case was settled for an amount smaller than that indicated.
56. See Quinn v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 409 N.Y.S.2d 473, 478 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
57. The House subcommittee report on product liability insurance notes the ISO estimate of 125,000 to 140,000 claims. SUBCOMMrrrEE ON CAPITAL, INVESTMENT AND BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES,

PRODUCT LIABILITY INSURANCE, H.R. REP. No. 95-997, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 38

(1978). The actual number of claims is probably even lower. See Fisk, An Interview with John
Lafalce, 14 TRIAL 58, 60 (Nov. 1978)(ISO estimates 60,000 to 140,000 claims); Geisel, Horror
Story Ads Untrue?-Can'tProve Mower, Claims Assertions, 11 Bus. INS. 1, 66 (October 31,
1977)(ISO estimates 60,000 to 70,000 claims); Aetna and the First Amendment, 8 JURIs
DOCTOR 30, 30 (Dec. 1978/Jan. 1979) (actual figure closer to 70,000).
58. See, e.g., SUSCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL, INVESTMENT, AND BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES,
PRODUCT LIABILrrY INSURANCE, H.R. REP. No. 95-997, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1978); Fisk, An
Interview With John LaFalce, 14 TRIAL 58, 60 (Nov. 1978); Geisel, Horror Story Ads
Untnse?-Can't Prove Mower, Claims Assertions, 11 Bus. INS. 1, 66 (October 31, 1977).
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but it would be most difficult to persuade the author that both the
previous and present attacks have not wrought a debilitating toll.
While it may be true that the average number of jury Verdicts in,
personal injury and wrongful death cases has increased in the past
twenty years in the very teeth of the attack by the insurance industry upon the tort system, it is simply'not true that the average size
of the verdict in "four-wheeler accidents" has increased.
Product Liability
In the area of product liability, which has been the focal point of
the recent ads, the insurance industry's cries of ."wolf" are equally
unsubstantiated. While the average number of claims may be increasing, they do not even come near the now discredited claim of
one million annually. 9 A more accurate gauge of the extent to which
product liability claims have reached "crisis" proportions is the
number of times a plaintiff wins and the size of the verdict in those
instances. Less than four percent of all product liability claims go
to verdict, 0 and the insurer wins seventy-five percent of those
suits 1 Accordingly, the plaintiff wins the lawsuit less than one
percent of the time. This figure hardly indicates, as the advertisements suggest, that juries have adopted a philosophy of caveat
fabricatorand a bias in favor of the plaintiff,
holding the manufac2
turer liable anytime a person is injured.

Nor do the amounts paid for bodily injuries as a result of product
liability suits justify insurance company hysteria. The Insurance
Services Office indicates that during the period of their closed claim
survey, 1976-1977, the average payment per bodily injury claim was
only.$13,911. 3 This figure itself is inaccurate due to "trending"
whereby the amounts actually paid are adjusted by an inflationary
factor. The actual average amount paid per bodily injury claim was
59. See notes 57-58 supra and accompanying text.
60. See SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL, INVESTMENT, AND BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES, PRODUCT
LIABILITY INSURANCE, H.R. REP. No. 95-997, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 56, 73 (1978). This figure
was reported in the Insurance Services Office Product Liability Closed Claims Survey. See
id. at 6, 56; Adding Insult to Injury-The Drive to Change the Product-LiabilityLaws, 43
CONSUMER REP. 412, 414 (July 1978).
61. See SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL, INVESTMENT, AND BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES, PRODUCT
LIABILITY INSURANCE, H.R. REP. No. 95-997, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 73 (1978); Fisk, An Interview with John LaFalce, 14 TRIAL 58, 60 (Nov. 1978).
62. See 124 CONG. REC. H3705 (daily ed. May 9, 1978).
63. See SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL, INVESTMENT, AND BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES, PRODUCT
LIABILITY INSURANCE, H.R. REP. No. 95-997, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1978).
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only $3,592."' The $13,911 figure was reached by applying an extremely high factor of twenty-five percent per year to the actual
amounts paid. "5
Excessive Verdicts
It is true that verdict size in product liability claims has increased
from 1971 to 1977, but the Jury Verdict Research Project indicates
that there has been a decrease in average verdicts from 1975-1976,
which is the last year for which they had reliable data." In fact, the
average yearly increase in verdict size for all personal injury suits
since 1973 has been only 7.47%, just under the average yearly increase in the Consumer Price Index for the same period. "7 These
figures hardly substantiate advertising claims of "runaway" juries.
Nor is there any validity to the impression created by the advertisements that most verdicts are in the neighborhood of a million
dollars with most of that amount allocated to punitive damages."
A House subcommittee report on product liability insurance concluded that "instances in which punitive damages have been
awarded have been negligible."" Moreover, awards for pain and
64. See id. at 33-34; Fisk, An Interview with John LaFalce, 14 TRIAL 56, 61 (Nov. 1978).
For each $3,592 almost one-fourth was attributable to claim administration expenses. See
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL, INVESTMENT,

AND BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES,

PRODUCT LIABILITY

INSURANCE, H.R. REP. No. 95-997, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1978). It would be of interest to
compare the amounts paid in premiums for product liability policies with the amounts
actually paid out. See Fisk, An Interview With John LaFalce, 14 TRIAL 58, 61 (Nov. 1978). It
might also be interesting to discover exactly how much the advertising in question has cost
and whether its cost is added to the expenses considered in determining premiums. See
generally Green, Blindfolding the Jury, 33 TEXAS L. REV. 157, 166 (1954) (efforts to influence
verdicts with threat of increased rates thereby preventing a verdict to which the accident
victim is entitled).
65. Even the $3,592 figure is misleading because it is computed only as the average of
claims paid and "excludes those instances where no payment is made." SUBCOMMITrEE ON
CAPITAL, INVESTMENT, AND BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES, PRODUCT LIABILITY INSURANCE, H.R. REP.
No. 95-997, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1978). Therefore, the figure does not represent the true
average of claim costs. Id.
66. Jury Verdict Research, Inc., Current Award Trends, 1 PERSONAL INJURY VALUATION
HANDBOOKS 1, 10-11 (1978). In other areas many personal injury suits have become no longer
economically feasible. See text at pages 410-11 supra.
67. Jury Verdict Research, Inc., Current Award Trends, 1 PERSONAL INJURY VALUATION
HANDBOOKS 1, 10 (1978). In fact, an article in Business Week indicates that the number of
claims against insurance companies steadily fell in 1977. See Sudden Riches for the Casualty
Insurers, Bus. WEEK, May 1, 1978, at 68 (auto claims dropped six percent).
68. See notes 63-67 supra and accompanying text.
69. SUBCOMMITTEE

ON CAPITAL, INVESTMENT, AND BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES, PRODUCT

LIABILITY INSURANCE, H.R. REP. No. 95-997, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 73 (1978); see Fisk, An
Interview with John LaFalce, 14 TRIAL 58, 61 (Nov. 1978). See generally Igoe, Punitive
Damages - An Analytical Perspective, 14 TRIAL 48 (Nov. 1978).
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suffering are not the bugaboo that insurance companies would have
readers believe. Of those injury victims who received awards in
excess of $100,000, only twenty-six percent of their recovery was for
pain and suffering; the balance was for economic losses.70
Even in instances in which the plaintiff was awarded in excess of
one million dollars, there is no indication that the award resulted
from an "out-of-control" tort system. Large judgments are not necessarily excessive. Many times such judgments are merely fair and
just compensation for grievous injuries suffered by the plaintiff.7
Whether a judgment is "excessive" is a question of law, and the
judicial system has adequate safequards to prevent a plaintiff from
receiving more than is fair and just. The courts may order a remittitur or a new trial if they believe the verdict was based on sympathy
or prejudice rather than the plaintiff's actual injuries." Thus, insurance advertising is misleading to the extent it implies that these
73
safeguards do not exist.
No Proof That Rates Need To Be Raised
The ads are also misleading in their implication that increases in
jury verdicts have necessitated higher premiums. This implication
cannotbe verified by available data. It is next to impossible to get
the necessary information from the insurance companies. In fact, no
pursuit has been more difficult than the efforts of the public, insurance commissioners, and consumer protection agencies to ascertain
the reason for the rising cost of insurance. Information that has
become available, however, produces some shocking revelations.
Only ten percent of all product liability premium dollars are computed actuarially; the other ninety percent are derived from the
subjective estimates of underwriters. 7 ' Thus, only a very small part
70. SUBCOMMrrrEE

ON CAPITAL, INVESTMENT, AND BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES,

PRODUCT LIA-

H.R. REP. No. 95-997, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1978).
71. Of the 188 verdicts of one million dollars or more reported by the Jury Verdict
Research Project, forty-eight were concerned with quadriplegia or paraplegia, fifty-five concerned brain damage often requiring twenty-four hour care, thirty-two were for wrongful
death, and fourteen pertained to amputation, usually multiple. Jury Verdict Research, Inc.,
BILrry INSURANCE,

Current Award Trends, 1 PERSONAL

INJURY VALUATION HANDBOOKS

1, 6-7 (1978). See also

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL, INVESTMENT, AND BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES,

INSURANCE,

PRODUCT LIABILITY

H.R. REP. No. 95-997, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1978)(pain and suffering awards

not necessarily excessive).
72. See Lahti v. McMenamin, 268 P. 644, 646-47 (Cal. 1928); Quinn v. Aetna Life & Cas.
Co., 409 N.Y.S.2d 473, 478 (Sup. Ct. 1978). See generally Green, Blindfolding the Jury, 33
TEXAS L. REv. 157, 166 (1954).
73. See Quinn v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 409 N.Y.S.2d 473, 478 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
74. Fisk, An Interview with John LaFalce,14 TRIAL 58, 60 (Nov. 1978); see SUBCOMMITTEE
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of product liability premiums is based on statistical data and the
accuracy of that data is impossible to verify.75 Since subjective judgments are based more on a particular perception of reality than on
the actual facts, there is great room for error. In view of the gross
differences between the reality that the insurance companies see
and represent and the true facts, 7 there is substantial support for
the view that these companies are overreacting, responding to their
fears rather than the true facts. 77 To expound as a blanket proposition that insurance premiums are increasing because of an increase
in and the size of verdicts for the plaintiff is inaccurate.
It is also inaccurate, if not intentionally misleading, for these
companies to imply through their advertisements that they are losing money because of liability insurance losses. A major portion of
the "losses" used in computing these underwriting losses is money
set aside in reserve for claims a company imagines might have arisen but which have not been reported-"incurred but not reported"
(IBNR).7 1 These reserves bear no relation to any statistical probability of unknown claims and serve mainly as a means of creative
accounting by the insurance companies. 79 By maintaining large
ON CAPITAL, INVESTMENT, AND BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES, PRODUCT LIABILITY INSURANCE,

H.R.

REP. No. 95-997, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1978). A brief explanation of the methods by

which premiums are determined can be found at pages 14-15 of the subcommittee report.
75. See SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL, INVESTMENT, AND BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES, PRODUCT
LIABILITY INSURANCE, H.R. REP. No, 95-997, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, 71 (1978); Adding Insult
to Injury-The Drive to Change the Product-LiabilityLaws, 43 CONSUMER REP. 412, 414 (July
1978).
76. See notes 52-73 supra and accompanying text.
77. See SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL, INVESTMENT, AND BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES, PRODUCT
LIABILITY INSURANCE, H.R. REP. No. 95-997, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 50-51 (1978); Fisk, An
Interview With John LaFalce, 14 TRIAL 58, 60 (Nov. 1978); Adding Insult to Injury-The
Drive to Change the Product-Liability Laws, 43 CONSUMER REP. 412, 415 (July 1978). A
similiar overreaction resulted in the manufacturing of the medical malpractice "crisis." Fisk,
An Interview With John LaFalce, 14 TRIAL 58, 61 (Nov. 1978); see SURcoMMIrrEE ON CAPITAL,
INVESTMENT, AND BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES, PRODUCT LIABILITY INSURANCE, H.R. REP. No. 95997, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1978); Sudden Riches for the CasualtyInsurers,Bus. WEEK, May
1, 1978, at 67.
78. See SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL, INVESTMENT, AND BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES, PRODUCT
LIABILITY INSURANCE, H.R. REP. No. 95-997, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 28-31 (1978). These reserves
are substantial -

up to 71.4% of Crum & Forster's losses. Fisk, An Interview with John

LaFalce, 14

TRIAL 58, 58 (Nov. 1978); see SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL, INVESTMENT, AND BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES, PRODUCT LIABILITY INSURANCE, H.R. REP. No. 95-997, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.

28-29 (1978) (tables containing. IBNR figures for several companies). Some companies even
set aside reserves to protect against not only projected claims for the next year, but for claims
that might arise in the future because a certain number of products were manufactured. See

Fisk, An Interview With John LaFalce, 14 TRIAL 58, 58-59 (Nov. 1978).
79. See Fisk, An Interview With John LaFalce, 14 TRIAL 58, 58-59 (Nov. 1978). Some
states are becoming aware of the insurance industry's use of IBNR reserving. States like
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INBR amounts, the companies can show large underwriting
"losses" and enjoy an increased fund for investment."0 Investments
have become an ever-increasing source, of income for the insurance
industry. Underwriting losses, if they actually occur,' are only a
part of the total economic picture. 2 While wailing over underwriting
"losses," the companies have watched their net worth increase dramatically."3 "If such substantial increases in net worth and asset size
can occur during a period in which underwriting deficits are sustained, serious questions as to the meaning of these underwriting
deficits must be raised." 8
The preceding discussion clearly shows that there is no justification for the insurance companies' pleas of poverty and continued
increase of premiums. The insurance industry claims are simply
unsupportable. There is ample evidence that these advertisements
are deceptive and misleading and not merely expressions of insurance industry opinions about the tort compensation system. When
the insurance companies' "right" to publish this deceptive advertising is balanced against a plaintiff's right to a fair trial in which
jurors consider only the evidence presented in' court and not insurance company propaganda, it is evident that these deceptive advertisements may be constitutionally enjoined.
PLAINTIFFS MUST BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY To EXPLORE THIS

SUBJECT ON Voir Dire

Although injunctive relief is possible when the advertising is deceptive, it is not necessarily the most productive means by which
Michigan, Florida, and Kansas have included in their "reform" legislation of product liability
laws provisions requiring disclosure, and even limitations, of IBNR amounts by insurance
companies. See Insurance Regulation: The Silent Revolution?,. 2 PRODUcT LIABILITY TRENDS
193, 193-97 (1978).
80. Fisk, An Interview with John LaFalce, 14 TRIAL 58, 59 (Nov. 1978). Another benefit
is the great tax benefits allowed on these reserves. Id. at 59; see SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL,
INVESTMENT,

AND

BUSINESS OPPORTuNrrrES, PRODUCT LIABIUTY INSURANCE, H.R. REP. No. 95.

997, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 30-31 (1978).
81. See notes 78-79 supra and accompanying text.

82. Fisk, An Interview With John LaFalce, 14 TRIAL 58, 58-59 (Nov. 1978); see 124 CONG.
REc. E3333 (daily ed. June 19, 1978).
83. Fisk, An Interview With John LaFalce, 14 TRIAL 58, 59 (Nov. 1978)(increase in net
worth of twenty-two percent in 1976); Sudden Riches for the Casualty Insurers,Bus. WEEK,
May 1, 1978, at 66 (twenty-one percent return on net worth in 1977). Investment income
generated from reserves more than makes up for any underwriting losses. See 124 CONG. REc.
E3333 (daily ed. June 19, 1978).
84. 124 CONG. Rxc. H3706 (daily ed. May 9, 1978); see 124 CONG. Rxc. E3334 (daily ed.
June 19, 1978).
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plaintiffs may protect themselves. Even when the constitutional
validity of an injunction is recognized, courts are reluctant to grant
such relief. Plaintiffs must have some way to protect themselves
from the influence of improper factors on verdicts. Texas courts
should allow plaintiffs to question prospective jurors about their
exposure to the insurance ads and even attempt to rehabilitate jurors who have been exposed. In addition, an instruction by the
court, telling the jurors that they must disregard these attempts to
influence their verdict, is necessary.
Authorities From Other Jurisdictions
The paucity of authority that Mr. Hatchell refers to is no doubt
due to the fact that most jurisdictions have virtually abolished voir
dire examination at the hands of counsel for the parties. This valuable right has been vitiated through interrogation by judges themselves. " The majority of jurisdictions that have considered the question, however, have recognized the plaintiff's right to examine prospective jurors about their exposure to the ads."5 These decisions
clearly suggest that such corrective inquiries may be necessary.
In a recent case, King v. Westlake, 7 the Arkansas Supreme Court
stated that a good faith inquiry about exposure to and impressions
from these ads was proper and necessary for intelligent exercise of
85. Denying the right of voir dire examination to counsel, however, is not tantamount
to suggesting that interrogation on this subject is improper. It may be that the area which
we are exploring is one that might lend itself more readily to judicial interrogation. Certainly
the concern of Texas courts that any mention of the rule that jurors are not to consider
insurance is an indirect suggestion that insurance is involved with the case would be alleviated by judicial questioning. In making this observation, however, this writer does not wish
to be understood as suggesting that Texas should deny the valuable right of voir dire examination to counsel. The eye-to-eye contact with prospective jurors is an important factor in
intelligent selection of the panel. It is hoped and trusted that this important right will never
be denied or diminished in this jurisdiction.
86. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Perrucci, 117 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Pa. 1953), appeal dismissed, 222 F.2d 709 (3d Cir. 1955); King v. Westlake, 572 S.W.2d 841, 844 (Ark. 1978);
Graham v. Waite, 257 N.Y.S.2d 629, 630 (App. Div. 1965) (memorandum opinion). But see
Kujawa v. Baltimore Transit Co., 167 A.2d 96, 98 (Md. 1961); Maness v. Bullins, 198 S.E.2d
752, 752-53 (N.C. Ct. App. 1973). In one of the recent attempts to enjoin insurance company
advertising, the court apparently saw no problem in allowing such questions on voir dire; it
merely stated that such questions would be insufficient to balance the great harm inflicted
by the ads on plaintiff's right to a fair trial. See Quinn v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 409 N.Y.S.2d
473, 481, 482 (Sup. Ct. 1978). Elizabeth Loftus, after discussing the results'of her tests of the
effect these advertisements have on jurors, suggests that such questions are necessary to
protect plaintiffs from the clout of these ads. See Loftus, Insurance Advertising and Jury
Awards, 65 A.B.A.J. 68, 70 (Jan. 1979).
87. 572 S.W.2d 841 (Ark. 1978).
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plaintiff's challenges. 8 At trial the plaintiff, after first establishing
that all but two of the jurors had been exposed to the ads, was
allowed to ask whether their verdict would be affected by the ads.89
The Arkansas court did not believe the questions implied that the
defendant carried liability insurance," and indeed, the questions
did not in any way imply that the defendant was insured. Such
questions should not be viewed as a violation of the prohibition
against mention of insurance or as an indirect inference that the
defendant is insured."
2 a New
Other courts have ruled similarly. In Graham v. Waite"
York court held that the plaintiff had a right to ascertain the impact
of advertising correlating high jury verdicts to high insurance premiums. 3 In Hoffman v. Perrucci,11 a suit seeking to enjoin similar
advertising in the 1950's, the court stated that an injunction was
improper, but that plaintiffs definitely had a right to ascertain the
effect such ads would have on prospective jurors and their verdict."
The right of a plaintiff to uncover the taint of insurance company
propaganda was also recognized by Connecticut's highest court." In
Lowell v. Daly7 the court held that the question asked by the plaintiff was too general and made no attempt to ask jurors whether they
had actually seen the articles in question.18 The court then stated,
however, that the plaintiff could have asked if jurors had in fact seen
the articles, saying "[ilf plaintiffs wished to ascertain or prove
which, if any, veniremen had read the articles in question . . . a
proper course to pursue would have been to inquire on the voir
dire.""
Other holdings lend support to the proposition that plaintiffs
have a right to examine prospective jurors concerning the ads.
Plaintiffs have been allowed to ask jurors if they are insured by a
mutual benefit company in which premiums are influenced by the
88.
89.
90.
91.
allowed
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 844. For the text of the question asked in Westlake, see note 22 supra.
Id. at 844.
Id. at 844.
Even with Texas' strict rule against mention of insurance, the plaintiff should be
at least this much leeway in his voir dire examination.
257 N.Y.S.2d 629 (App. Div. 1965)(memorandum opinion).
Id. at 630.
117 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Pa. 1953), appeal dismissed, 222 F.2d 709 (3d Cir. 1955).
Id. at 40.

96. See Lowell v. Daly, 169 A.2d 888, 889 (Conn. 1961).
97. 169 A.2d 888 (Conn. 1961).
98. Id. at 889.
99. Id. at 889.
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size of verdicts paid.'0 Additionally, the Oregon Supreme Court has
held that questioning jurors about whether they believed they had
a financial interest in the case or thought that a large verdict would
increase their cost of living was not reversible error. 01 Other courts
have gone further, stating that because of the widespread use of the
advertisements the mention of insurance is no longer prejudicial. 02
The courts that have refused to allow questions aimed at unearthing prejudice created by insurance company propaganda have
not necessarily laid down an absolute prohibition against such
questions. In Kiernan v. Van Schaik' 3 the court merely held it was
not an abuse of the trial court's discretion to refuse to allow such
questions.' The Kentucky Court of Appeals has ruled similarly
when jurors had already been asked if they could reach a fair and
impartial verdict. 0 5 In two other decisions the courts indicated
that in those cases questions similar to those discussed here were
improper, but implied that other questions directed at the same
purpose might not be. 0 In only one case, Maness v. Bullins,'7 has
5 If the rule
there been an outright refusal to allow such questions.""
100. See Dedmon v. Thalheimer, 290 S.W.2d 16, 16-17 (Ark. 1956). In a later case in
addition to the general question, the plaintiff asked if any jurors were employed by a specific
company. The court held the second question was improper, saying that "naming of the
Travelers Insurance Company in the voir dire examination was more than [the plaintiff'sl
attorneys were entitled to." Malone v. Riley, 321 S.W.2d 743, 744 (Ark. 1959).
101. Johnson v. Hansen, 389 P.2d 330, 331-32 (Or. 1964) (en banc). The court noted that
"the increment of prejudice in this case was very slight. The improper questions did not
obviously carry an insurance label." Id. at 332. In a concurring opinion Justice Denecke
suggested that while such a question might suggest to judges and attorneys that the defendant
had insurance, the innuendo was not so obvious to jurors. Id. at 333 (Denecke, J., specially
concurring). In an additional concurrence, Justice O'Connell felt that the prejudicial effect
of such questions was slight in view of insurance company advertising. Id. at 335-36, 338
(O'Connell, J., specially concurring).
102. See Muehlebach v. Mercer Mortuary & Chapel, Inc., 378 P.2d 741, 744 (Ariz.
1963)(en banc); Causey v. Cornelius, 330 P.2d 468, 474 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958), quoting,
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 304 P.2d 13, 18 (Cal. 1956)(Carter, J.,
dissenting).
103. 347 F.2d 775 (3d Cir. 1965).
104. Id. at 777, 783.
105. See Murrell v. Spillman, 442 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Ky. 1969); Farmer v. Pearl, 415
S.W.2d 358, 361 (Ky. 1967).
106. See Barton v. Owen, 139 Cal. Rptr. 494, 508 (Ct. App. 1977)(plaintiff could have
asked if panel was prejudiced against plaintiffs in malpractice cases); Kujawa v. Baltimore
Transit Co., 167 A.2d 96, 98 (Md. 1961) (no showing plaintiff was prejudiced by trial court's
refusal to permit question; not an abuse of discretion to prohibit question). In point of fact,
however, it is hard to imagine how the plaintiffs in either case could have asked questions
less suggestive of insurance and still acquire the information they were seeking.
107. 198 S.E.2d 752 (N.C. Ct. App. 1973).
108. Id. at 752-53.
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in Maness is followed, plaintiffs will be defenseless against the
prejudices created by these deceptive and misleading insurance
company ads.
There Is a Need To Interrogate the Panel on This Subject
The authorities cited indicate that most courts are willing to allow
the plaintiff to protect himself by questioning jurors about exposure
to and impressions from the ads, and it is submitted that there is
really no reason why the plaintiff should not be allowed to ask such
questions. Mr. Hatchell presents a formidable argument against
broadening the voir dire inquiry, either by the court or counsel, to
include matters relating to publications concerning insurance costs,
runaway juries, liberal courts, and unscrupulous lawyers and doctors. Similar propaganda has been circulated by mail to the
insurance-buying public by agents and representatives, mostly in
the nature of explaining, "What makes your rates so high." He
does not even deny the purpose of these blitzkriegs or that they
are intended to reach potential jurors, but instead suggests that
there are a great number of similar social influences that are
brought to bear in the mainstream of a potential juror's consciousness that might be appropriate subjects for the defendant's voir dire
if the advertising questions are allowed.
There are two responses to this argument. First, depending upon
the discretion of the trial judge, many of these matters are presently
inquired into by defense counsel. Second, many matters mentioned
by Mr. Hatchell that should be inquired into if we abandon the
stricture against mention of insurance are matters that arise in the
context of the environment and are nothing more than societal patterns. What we are talking about here are intentional efforts to
reach and contaminatejurors!
The insurance companies have taken an ambivalent attitude
about jurors' knowledge and consideration of insurance. They have
always been. leaders in the fight against advising jurors of the real
party in interest in most personal injury cases, but now these same
companies are publishing ads urging jurors to remember that the
defendant does have insurance and their verdicts will affect their
own insurance rates. One can be certain, however, that even though
an enormous campaign has been waged' 9 seeking to insure that
109. See notes 44-45 supra and accompanying text.
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jurors are aware of the existence of insurance and even to influence
jurors to put their own alleged financial interest over the plaintiff's
right to a fair trial, the insurance company's defense attorneys will
knock each other over leaping up to object the first time the slightest
inference of insurance is made at trial. 10 The insurance companies
should not be allowed to have it both ways. If they have changed
their position about the prohibition against informing jurors about
the existence of insurance, no doubt plaintiffs' attorneys would be
more than willing to help draft a fair instruction regarding the existence of insurance, the means by which premiums are determined,
and the effect of a verdict for the plaintiff on premium cost. This
writer has serious doubts, however, that there will be a mad dash
on the part of the insurance companies to accept this invitation.
It is unlikely that the insurance industry is interested in having
both sides of the story told. In fact, one can imagine the hue and
cry of the defense community if consumers could surmount the
economic burdens and reveal all the reasons for increased insurance
rates and disclose the profits the casualty industry has received
from the premium payers throughout these periods of attack. Something must be done, however, to protect the rights of individual
plaintiffs. Because of the vast expense involved, such an advertising
counterattack is not possible. Thus, under the present strict rule in
Texas, the plaintiff finds himself in a very difficult position. Potential jurors are being bombarded by insurance company propaganda,
but the present rule prevents the plaintiff from determining if the
panel seated to hear his case has been prejudiced against him by
these ads."'
There is no reason for the prohibition against mentioning insurance to prevent plaintiffs from seeking to discover, and perhaps
counteract, any prejudice created by the ads. The plaintiff is not
interested in injecting insurance into the trial; he is only interested
in securing sufficient information to determine if any juror should
be challenged for cause or to intelligently exercise his peremptory
challenges."' The plaintiff is only interested in ensuring that the
110. See Causey v. Cornelius, 330 P.2d 468, 473 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958). See generally
Quinn v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 409 N.Y.S.2d 473, 480-81 (Sup. Ct. 1978). For a further
discussion of these companies' amazing ability to present "different facts to different groups,
depending upon their advocacy purpose," see Fisk, An Interview With John LaFalce, 14 TRIAL
58, 59 (Nov. 1978).
111. Martin Baron, counsel for plaintiff in Quinn v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., notes that
"'the insurance companies are making a case in the media that I can't challenge in the
courtroom.' "Aetna and the First Amendment, 8 Jumas DOCTOR 30, 30 (Dec. 1978/Jan. 1979).
112. See King v. Westlake, 572 S.W.2d 841, 844 (Ark. 1978); Dedmon v. Thalheimer,
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jurors disregard extraneous influences in their consideration of his
case. Questions and instructions could be phrased to minimize any
3
inference of insurance or prejudice to the insurance company.1

It would appear that the more difficult problem has to do with
the ability of affected jurors to admit, or even discern, the effect of
the ads. It is with greatest reluctance that any juror will admit to
any type of "bias or prejudice" upon interrogation."' Two factors
operate to create this incongruity. First, the words "bias" and
"prejudice" suggest evil or impropriety to the average person. This
connotation is, of course, not accurate- any more than it is evil or
wrong to prefer one football team over another. Nonetheless, in
many instances potential jurors simply will not admit that they
have any bias or prejudice that would cause them to be unable to
follow their oaths as jurors, except for the cases in which the juror
simply does not want to serve or perform a public duty.
Second, more often than not these attacks are invidious in that
they are calculated to subliminally affect the mind of the targeted
person and only rarely may be recalled even under direct interrogation on the subject. Thus, under this premise, what value is there
in seeking to eradicate an advertisement or circular that might have
been read or heard? The answer to this query is that a negative
response by a juror who has been asked if he has been prejudiced
by the advertisements is not unlike negative answers by jurors who
have read in detail about a given homicide case, or a notorious piece
of civil litigation, which they deny will have any effect on their
deliberations. Every lawyer and judge is fully aware that these
claims of eradication are nothing more than the feeling or apprehension the potential juror has against being accused or challenged for
290 S.W.2d 16, 17 (Ark. 1956); Johnson v. Hansen, 389 P.2d 330, 335-36 (Or. 1964) (en
banc)(concurring opinion). Other courts have recognized the plaintiff's need in situations
concerning questions about jurors' interest or connection with insurance companies. See
Kiernan v. Van Schaik, 347 F.2d 775, 782 (3d Cir. 1965); Harvey v. Castleberry, 529 S.W.2d
324, 328-29 (Ark. 1975)(dissenting opinion); Mathena v., Burchett, 369 P.2d 487, 490 (Kan.
1962). A similiar argument has been accepted by the Austin Court of Civil Appeals in South
Austin Drive-In Theatre v. Thomison, 421 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1967, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
113. See Johnson v. Hansen, 389 P.2d 330, 333 (1964) (en banc)(concurring opinion) (innuendo of insurance not so obvious to jurors). In a study in 1965, of the eighty-six jurors who
were asked the insurance company connection question, only forty-five understood the significance of the question. Even with those forty-five, the question was only a minor factor in their
assumption that the defendant had insurance. When questioned about the reasons for their
assumption, no juror mentioned the voir dire question. See Broeder, Voir DireExaminations:
An Empirical Study, 38 S. CAL. L. Rav. 503, 525 (1965).
114. See United States v. Allsup, 566 F.2d 68, 71 (9th Cir. 1977).
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cause for having formulated a view of the case. In such instances it
is important, at the very least, for the litigants to know of such
knowledge or circumstances to aid in the exercise of the peremptory
challenge.
A

PROPOSAL

Not only do plaintiffs need sufficient information to exercise their
peremptory challenges, but they need at least a limited opportunity
to counteract the insurance companies' misleading propaganda or
to establish grounds for challenge for cause. So long as the trial
judge or counsel do not suggest the existence or non-existence of
insurance, no harm is done by asking the panel broad questions
concerning their recollection of reading such articles or receiving
communications relating to the jury system and then individually
interrogating those that indicate they have received such information. As to those that do not acknowledge the receipt or examination
of such materials, certainly general questions relating to their experiences or apprehensions regarding personal injury litigation and
possible insurance coverage should be permitted.
Plaintiff's Voir Dire
Plaintiff should be allowed to ask, "Have any of you seen the
recent magazine advertisements relating to jury verdicts?" Those
that answer this question affirmatively could be questioned individually, perhaps at the bench to avoid tainting the rest of the panel." 5
Some other questions that the plaintiff might want to ask each juror
are:
(1) Did you infer from these ads that your verdict in this suit
might have an effect on your insurance premiums?
(2) Do you agree with me that the plaintiff has a right to a fair
and impartial trial determined on the evidence and instructions presented in court and that it is improper for anyone to introduce or
consider other, extraneous matters that would prevent the plaintiff
from receiving a fair trial?
(3) Do you realize that there is no basis for the claim that insurance premiums are directly affected by jury verdicts and that your
115. Before continuing the individual interrogation, it might be best for counsel, or the
court, to instruct the jury that the questions have nothing to do with insurance, but only with
their exposure to the ads and inferences they may have drawn from such advertising. See
King v. Westlake, 572 S.W.2d 841, 844 (Ark. 1978). Counsel might also want to precede the
questioning about advertising with a question about whether the jurors agree with him that
any attempt to influence their judgment about the validity of the plaintiff's case before any
evidence is heard is improper.
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verdict here will have little, if any, effect on your insurance costs?
(4) Will you be able to disregard any possible effect, real or imagined, large or small, your verdict might have on your insurance rates
and give the plaintiff an award that is fair and just compensation for
the injuries he has received?
(5) . Can you promise me that your verdict will be based on the
evidence presented in court and the instructions given you by the
judge and that you will disregard these attempts to have you consider
extraneous matters or your own supposed financial interests in violation of your oath as a juror?
The Court's Instruction
An instruction by the court also should be given to insure that the
plaintiff is not prejudiced by insurance company attempts to introduce extraneous factors into the case by way of suggestion and to
eliminate any implication that counsel for one of the parties would
inject the existence or non-existence of insurance. It is thought the
following instruction, or one similar thereto, should be given in writing and verbally to the panel:
Ladies and Gentlemen:
Both parties and the court want jurors who are as free as possible
of any prejudice or feelings against their claim or defense, and who
have no reasons, whether real or imaginary, that might affect their
ability to fairly consider the fact questions that I will submit to you
at the end of the case. I want to assure you that it is not important
to me that you do have such feelings or reasons, but it is vitally important that you tell me now if you do.
You are not here to decide who should win or lose; you are here
solely and only for the purpose of deciding the questions I will submit
to you, without regard to whether I will enter a judgment on your
answers, or whether any judgment I enter will be paid, or who will
pay it, or whether it ever will be paid. That is plainly and simply not
your purpose, and if you make it so, you have not performed your
duty or lived up to your oath to render a true verdict.
It is equally important for the parties to know if you have any such
feelings or reasons that might affect your verdict. Not only do they
have the right to know, so that they can question me about whether
you should serve in this case, but they have a right on their own to
strike or remove several of you from the panel. These rights are sacred
to the jury system. In exercising these rights, the parties are in no way
questioning your ability to serve as a juror. Rather, they realize that
some of you may have some strong feelings or opinions that might
make service on this jury difficult for you.
For example, some of the situations we often see are people who
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have had bad experiences arising from accidents; or are opposed to
this type of accident litigation; or who have had unfortunate experiences with lawyers, courts, or big corn ?anies; or who believe damages
should not be awarded for pain and suffering; or that there should be
a limit on what should be awarded for pain and suffering, loss of life,
or physical impairment; or who have read advertisements or received
circulars related to jury verdicts that have so influenced them that
they have formed definite opinions in regard to them; or who fear
their insurance rates will increase as a result of their verdict.
If any of you have or entertain such feelings, or have heard or read
such matters, please understand I will not try to change your mind,
or give you a lecture. I will want you to disclose it to me so that the
parties and I can know how it might affect your possible service in
this case.
In giving you these instructions and requesting this information, I
do not intend to suggest in any way that any party is or is not protected by any form of insurance. In fact, my sole purpose is to have
you realize and appreciate that if you are selected, these considerations have absolutely nothing to do with your service and deliberations. The only duty you have is to truthfully answer the questions I
ask you based solely on the evidence and my instructions to you.
Each party is entitled to a verdict based only on the evidence and
instructions presented by the court and to a jury who have no feelings
either for or against their claim or defense.
Now, if any of you have any such reasons or feelings, will you
indicate by your raised hands so that I may have you come forward
and ask you a few more questions privately?
Such an instruction would go a long way toward alleviating the
problem caused by the recent insurance company premium/verdict
advertising.
CONCLUSION

By allowing plaintiffs an opportunity to examine jurors on voir
dire about these advertisements and giving the foregoing instruction, Texas courts can counteract some of the deleterious effects of
this recent attack on our judicial system. The deceptive and mis-

leading aspects of this advertising may be controlled by injunction
or order of the Texas Insurance Board, but the deliberate attempt
to have jurors consider their own insurance costs rather than the
merits of the plaintiff's claim can only be cured by expanded rights
on voir dire and appropriate instructions. The tort system preceded
the insurance casualty business and with a little care the system
will survive the powerful economic pressure exerted by the insur-
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ance industry. To destroy and lay to rest the "fault" system without further attempting to save it from these ravaging attacks is an
abdication of judicial responsibility.
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